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Over the last two decades, employers have increasingly offered workers a choice of health plans.
The availability of choice has the potentially beneficial effects of lowering the cost and increasing
the quality of health care through greater competition among health plans for enrollees as well as
allowing consumers to enroll in the type of coverage that most closely matches their preferences.
On the other hand, concerns about the potential for adverse selection within employment-based
purchasing in response to the availability of choice exist.  In this paper, I examine the effects of
offering choice in employment-based purchasing groups on access to and the cost of employer-
sponsored coverage.  I find that greater availability of choice was associated with a reduction in the
premium of employer-sponsored coverage and an increase in the proportion of workers covered by
the plans offered by employers.  However, most of the premium reductions were due to a shift from
family to single coverage within employment-based purchasing groups and a reduction in the
generosity of the plans in which employees were enrolled.  The results are not consistent with the
availability of choice leading to lower premiums through greater competition among plans for
workers.
M. Kate Bundorf
Department of Health Research and Policy
Stanford University School of Medicine




I.  Introduction 
Over the last two decades, employers have increasingly offered workers a choice of 
health plans.  From 1977 and 1998, the percent of employees offered more than one plan by their 
employer grew from 18% to 66% (Gabel 1999).  Two explanations for the decision of employers 
to offer a choice among plans have been advanced in the literature.  Employers offering a choice 
of plans may be implementing a managed competition approach to benefit design.   Under 
managed competition, employers offer multiple plans with standardized benefits and require 
workers to pay the incremental premium for more expensive plans out-of-pocket.  The objective 
is to create incentives for workers to make cost-effective enrollment decisions, which, in turn, 
encourages plans through greater competition for enrollees within a firm to increase the quality 
and lower the cost of the health care they provide (Enthoven and Kronick 1989).   
The prevalence of health plan choice within employment-based purchasing groups, 
however, is not consistent with the widespread adoption of a managed competition approach to 
benefit design by employers.  Long and Marquis (1998) examine the extent to which employers 
offer a choice of plans, require employees to pay the incremental premium associated with more 
expensive coverage, and provide quality information to employees and find that, in 1997, 
relatively few employers had adopted the managed competition model.  Approximately 28% of 
employees offered a choice among plans faced an equal dollar employer contribution and only 
one-quarter of the largest employers offering a choice of plans provided employees with quality 
information.  (Levy 1997) finds that only one-sixth of employee contributions to health plan 
premiums can be explained by the adoption of managed competition using employer survey data 
from 1993.    2
An alternative explanation for the decision of employers to offer a choice among plans is 
that they are responding to heterogeneity among individuals within the firm in their preferences 
for health insurance (Goldstein and Pauly 1976).  The hypothesis underlying this work is that 
employers minimize compensation costs by offering workers their optimal combination of cash 
wages and fringe benefits (Summers 1989).  For employers hiring workers with varying 
preferences for health insurance, this implies that optimal compensation for the workforce 
requires offering multiple health plans, with each being the preferred choice of a subgroup of 
employees.  Theoretical studies examining employer health benefit choices when employees 
vary in their preferences for coverage have demonstrated the tradeoffs employers may make 
between the costs of greater customization and their incentives to offer employees plans that 
more closely match individual preferences  (Goldstein and Pauly 1976; Danzon 1989; Bundorf 
2000).  In these types of models, the existence of plan choice in employment-based purchasing 
groups is driven by heterogeneity in employee preferences for health insurance rather than a 
strategy to foster competition among plans.  
Recent studies have provided some empirical evidence supporting the role of employee 
preferences in influencing employer health benefit choices.  Variation in worker demographic 
characteristics is positively associated with the decision of employers to offer a choice of plans 
to workers and the extent of variation in the plans offered  (Moran, Chernew et al. 2001; Bundorf 
2002).  Using tax prices as a measure of worker preferences, Gruber and Lettau (2000) find that 
both the median and the dispersion of tax prices within the firm explain the decision to offer 
coverage and the dollar value of coverage offered.  Studies by Levy (1997) and Dranove, Spier et 
al. (2000) suggest that the use of employee premium contributions is driven by within-firm 
variation in health insurance preferences.  While these studies suggest that workforce   3
composition is a determinant of employer choices, they also do not explain a large proportion of 
employer purchasing behavior. 
Relatively few studies have examined the implications of offering a choice of plans 
within employment-based purchasing groups, and those that do generally examine the managed 
competition approach to benefit design.  In particular, Vistnes, Cooper et al. (2001) examine the 
assumption that competition among plans for enrollees within an employment-based purchasing 
group is necessary to generate gains from competition.  In their theoretical work, they propose 
that competition among plans to be offered by an employer is equally or may be even more 
effective in lowering premiums.  In their empirical work, however, they find support for 
managed competition in the sense that that premiums decline when employers offer additional 
plans and make a fixed dollar contribution to the plan premium.    
Cutler and Reber (1998), however, provide evidence that requiring workers within a 
group to pay the full marginal cost of more expensive plans may lead to adverse selection within 
employment-based groups.  They examine the effects of the switch to a managed competition 
style fixed premium contribution within a single employment-based purchasing group and find 
that gains from competition in the form of reduced premiums were offset by losses due to 
adverse selection.  In the group they studied, the more generous PPO plan was eliminated by an 
adverse selection “death spiral” within 3 years of the introduction of the policy.  The results 
suggest that offering plans that are differentially attractive to different risk types, in combination 
with a fixed employer premium contribution, will likely trigger significant adverse selection in 
insurance coverage 
1.      
                                                 
1 A “pure” managed competition approach would require standardized benefits to reduce incentives for selection 
based on risk type.   4
Taken together, these studies suggest that, while shifting the cost of more expensive plans 
to employees in the form of higher employer premium contributions may generate competitive 
pressures resulting in lower premiums, moving too aggressively in that direction may induce 
significant adverse selection within a group.  Although it does not explicitly examine the effects 
of offering a choice of plans, one study questions even the competitive benefits of offering health 
plan choice (Feldman, Dowd et al. 1993).  These authors find that offering an HMO raises the 
average premium per covered worker for both single and family coverage relative to offering 
only a fee-for-service plan.  Not only were HMOs more costly than FFS plans, offering an HMO 
with a FFS plan increased the premium of the FFS plan, resulting in overall increases in the cost 
of employer-sponsored coverage.  The study, however, was based on data from 239 Minnesota 
firms in 1986, suggesting that results are unlikely to be generalizable either to the nation as a 
whole or the current managed care environment.  In addition, it is unlikely that the authors were 
able to adequately control for endogeneity in the decision to offer an HMO, potentially biasing 
the results. 
While these studies provide important insight into the potential challenges facing 
employers in offering choice among plans, their results are somewhat at odds with overall trends 
in the market.  While traditional FFS plans have been nearly eliminated from the market, PPOs, 
another less restrictive type of coverage, have co-existed and even thrived along with HMOs.  
Theoretical work suggests that multiple-choice arrangements with an employment-based group 
will not necessarily be plagued by adverse selection.  Chernew and Frick (1999) demonstrate that 
the potential effects on equilibria of introducing a managed care type of product in the market are 
ambiguous.  They model managed care as adding a third dimension, “managedness”, to the 
premium and cost sharing product space and find that, in cases where an equilibrium existed in   5
the two-dimension product space, the introduction of managed care may result in no equilibrium.  
On the other hand, managed care may generate an equilibrium in cases in which one did not exist 
in the two-dimensional analysis by allowing low-risk consumers an additional mechanism to 
distinguish themselves from high-risk consumers.  In addition, employers may adopt premium 
contribution policies that support the stability of multiple-choice arrangement.  Rather than 
adopting a fixed employer contribution, employers may set differential contributions across plans 
in order to maintain the stability of multiple choice arrangements in the face of risk variation 
among workers (Cutler and Reber 1998; Pauly and Herring 2000).    
While numerous studies have demonstrated that existence of biased selection based 
health risk among different types of plans, with HMOs and managed care plans generally 
experience favorable selection (Hellinger 1995), this type of risk segmentation does not 
necessarily signal the existence of adverse selection (Pauly 1984).  Preferences for health plans 
may be correlated with health risk, resulting in risk segmentation even in the absence of 
imperfect information.  Based on this observation, Feldman and Dowd (2000) propose that 
managed care may be an efficient mechanism to segment risks, allowing low risk consumers to 
purchase full coverage at a price closer to the actuarially fair premium, although others have 
argued that the actions taken by plans to attract low risk consumers are inefficient (Newhouse 
1996).  Arguably, enrollment in HMOs in a firm offering a choice of plans may signal the 
existence of adverse selection if the workers enrolled in these types of plans would have 
preferred a more generous plans at the actuarially fair premium.  However, studies examining 
enrollee satisfaction have found higher satisfaction among HMO enrollees with a choice among 
plans than those without a choice at the time of enrollment (Ullman, Hill et al. 1997; Gawande,   6
Blendon et al. 1998). This is more consistent with efficient risk segmentation than the existence 
of widespread adverse selection.  
In summary, relatively little is known about the effects on consumers of the trend toward 
greater prevalence of choice among health plans.  The availability of choice has the potentially 
beneficial effects of lowering the cost and increasing the quality of health care through greater 
competition as well as allowing consumers to enroll in the type of coverage that most closely 
matches their preferences.  On the other hand, concerns about the potential for adverse selection 
within employment-based purchasing in response to the availability of choice exist.  In this 
paper, I examine the effects of offering choice in employment-based purchasing groups on 
access to and the cost of employer-sponsored coverage.  I hypothesize that the introduction of 
managed care, HMOs specifically, facilitated the offering of choice within employment-based 
purchasing groups.  I then use geographic variation in the availability of HMOs in the 1990s as 
an instrument for offering health plan choice.  I find that greater availability of choice was 
associated with reductions in the premiums of employer-sponsored coverage and increases in the 
proportion of workers covered by the plans offered by employers.  However, most of the 
premium reductions were due to a shift from family to single coverage within employment-based 
purchasing groups and a reduction in the generosity of the plans in which employees were 
enrolled.  The results are not consistent with the availability of choice leading to lower premiums 
through greater competition among plans for workers.   
 
II. Theoretical  Framework 
A.  The Employer’s Decision to Offer a Choice of Plans   7
The analysis is based on a model of an employer choosing a set of health benefits with 
the objective of minimizing total compensation costs when workers in a firm have heterogeneous 
preferences for health insurance.  The model is based on two important assumptions.  First, 
employees bear the full incidence of health insurance premiums in the form of lower cash wages.  
This is supported by empirical evidence of wage offsets based on average, but not individual, 
characteristics (Gruber 1994; Pauly and Herring 1999; Sheiner 1999).  Second, variation exists 
among workers in their preferences for health insurance and imperfect sorting of workers among 
firms based on these preferences exist.  This is also likely to be true.  Individuals vary in income, 
risk aversion, and preferences for a style of care, all of which may affect their preferences for 
health insurance coverage.  In addition, the matching of workers to jobs is likely to be influenced 
by factors other than health insurance preferences resulting in within firm variation in demand 
for health insurance.   
In order to motivate the analysis of the effects of health plan choice, I present a simple 
theoretical model of the decision of an employer to offer a choice of plans.  Assume a worker of 
type i maximizes utility, which is function of money (m) and health insurance (k), by allocating 










i i k w be the allocation between cash wages and health insurance that satisfies this condition for 
a worker of type i.  In this analysis, this quantity is defined as the employee’s benchmark 
quantity – the quantity the employee would have chosen in the absence of the employer as the 
purchaser.
2    
                                                 
2 It is worthwhile to note that the employee’s benchmark quantity is not the optimal quantity.  By reducing the price 
of health insurance relative to cash wages, the tax treatment of health benefits creates incentives for workers to 
purchase greater amounts of health insurance than they would have otherwise.  Thus, the tax treatment of employer-
sponsored coverage creates welfare loss through the distortion of the quantity of coverage purchased by the   8
For an individual employee, the employer’s cost minimizing allocation of compensation 
between cash wages and health insurance is the employees’ optimal allocation (Summers 1989).  
Thus, in a firm comprised of workers with homogeneous preferences for health insurance, an 
employer minimizing total compensation costs will offer a single plan, the most preferred plan of 
workers in the firm.  More likely than the case of perfect sorting, however, is the existence of 
within firm heterogeneity in preferences for coverage.  Goldstein and Pauly (1976) consider the 
case of a cost-minimizing firm choosing a single level of coverage to offer two types of workers.  
They assume the firm must hire a fixed quantity of workers of two different skill types due to 
production requirements and that preferences for health insurance are perfectly correlated within, 
but differ between, worker skill types. 
The employer’s problem is as follows: 
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i i i i k w U U .  The reservation utility of a 
worker of type i is based on the assumption that the worker is able to obtain his or her 
benchmark wage and health insurance compensation package from an alternative employer.  
Solving the employer’s problem produces the following condition defining the single level of 
coverage chosen by the firm. 
                                                                                                                                                             
employee.  In addition, this excessive amount of coverage has second order effects on the quantity of health services 
consumed by employees due to the existence of moral hazard in health insurance (Pauly 1986).   9
 
In equation (2), the firm equates the cost of deviations from the optimal level of health insurance 
for each type of worker.  The cost to the firm of increasing a unit of coverage is the per unit 
premium less the corresponding wage differential for each type of worker which is necessary to 
maintain the worker’s reservation utility level.  Assuming type A workers have stronger 
preferences for health insurance than type B workers, the single level of coverage chosen by the 
firm will be less than the benchmark level for these workers.   Because the marginal utility of 
health insurance relative to wages for type A workers is greater than the marginal cost of health 
insurance, an increase in the level of coverage would result in a decrease in cash wages 
necessary to retain workers of type A that is greater than the price of the incremental unit of 
health insurance.  For the type B workers, the firm offers a quantity of health insurance that is 
greater than the worker’s benchmark quantity, and the value workers place on the incremental 
units is less than their marginal cost.  Thus, increasing the amount of health insurance provided is 
costly to the firm in the sense that it would be less costly to compensate these workers in the 
form of additional cash wages. 
Danzon (1989) quantifies the cost to the employer of heterogeneity in worker preferences 
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k  is the solution to the firm’s one plan cost minimization problem, t
i is the marginal tax 
rate for a worker of type i, and F1 is the fixed cost of offering a single plan. The employer could 
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reduce heterogeneity costs by offering workers of each type their benchmark wage and health 
insurance compensation package.  However, offering multiple plans is also costly for the firm.  
These costs are in the form of increased loading resulting from fewer workers enrolled in each 
plan and the fixed costs of administering multiple plans.  In deciding between offering one or 
two plans to a workforce made up of two types of workers, the firm’s decision rule can be 
expressed as follows: 
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where F2 is the fixed cost of offering multiple plans.  
Thus, the firm compares the cost, in the form of incremental wages, of not providing each 
type of worker with his or her benchmark level of coverage to the incremental cost of offering 
two plans.  The decision to offer a choice of plans is a function of worker preferences for 
coverage, the number of workers overall and the number of workers of each type, the per unit 
price of health insurance. 
In this model of employer behavior, employee premium contributions are necessary to 
induce workers to self-select into particular types of plans.  The favorable tax treatment of 
employer-sponsored coverage is contingent upon satisfying certain non-discrimination 
requirements which are intended to prevent discrimination in the provision of fringe benefits in 
favor of highly compensated employees.  While the specifics of the non-discrimination 
requirements vary by the funding and structure of the employer’s health benefit plan, in general, 
they require that all plans offered by an employer are offered to all workers in the firm with some   11
exceptions.
3 based on age, full-time status, tenure with the firm, union status, and residency 
status.  Thus, in a multiple-choice setting, employers may adopt employee contributions to create 
incentives for workers to enroll in less expensive plans.  However, in many cases, employee 
premium contributions are not considered tax-exempt compensation.  As a result, employers 
have incentives to minimize the size of these contributions.  Bundorf (2000) finds that the 
differential tax treatment of employee and employer premium contributions, combined with the 
non-discrimination rule, creates incentives for employers to reduce the extent of differentiation 
between plans offered and reduces the extent to which offering multiple plans reduces total 
compensation costs when workers have heterogeneous preferences for coverage. 
B.  The Effects of Offering a Choice of Plans 
 In this model, employers make health benefit choices with the objective of minimizing 
total compensation costs for a given set of workers where total compensation costs are the sum 




l i K L w T *  (6) 
where L represents the number of employees in the firm,
c L  is the number of workers 
covered by health insurance,  l w is the cash wage received by employee l when the employer 
offers health insurance, and K is the average premium paid by the employer for health insurance.  
The employer offers a choice of plans if 
1 1 = > <
n n T T  where n is the number of plans offered, and 
the primary empirical prediction is that offering a choice of plans will reduce total compensation 
costs.   
                                                 
3 Exceptions include employees under the age of 25, part-time and seasonal workers, workers with less than 3 years 
of service, workers covered by a collective bargaining plan, and non-resident aliens.     12
The effects on the components of total compensation, however, may vary.  On net, the 
reduction in total compensation could be due to either a reduction in total cash wages, a 
reduction in total health insurance premiums, or a reduction in both.  However, either component 
of compensation could increase if the corresponding reduction in the other were larger.  For 
example, the average premium may increase for an employer offering a choice of plans rather 
than a single plan due to an increase in the generosity of coverage on average, if a more and less 
generous plan are offered, but a greater proportion of employees enroll in the more generous 
coverage.  In addition, higher loading of premiums resulting from smaller numbers of workers 
enrolled in each plan could increase average premiums.  Holding all else constant, however, 
differential selection of employees among plans should have no effect on average premiums.  In 
the case that average premiums rise, the value that employees place on the new coverage must 
exceed the cost of providing it and employers must be able to make the corresponding wage 
adjustment.  If premiums decrease on average, through a shift in enrollment to a lower cost plan, 
for example, in equilibrium, cash wages are likely to increase.  However, the increase in cash 
wages would have to be less than the decrease in premiums to create incentives for employers to 
offer the new benefit.  In either situation, the proportion of workers covered by the employer 
should be non-decreasing. 
C.  The effect of managed care on the decision to offer a choice among plans 
Although the term “managed care” encompasses a wide range of health insurance 
products, in general, it refers to arrangements under which health insurers structure contracts 
with providers to influence the types of care plan enrollees receive (Glied 2000).  In this analysis, 
the introduction and growth of managed care, and HMOs specifically, is considered an increase 
in the extent of product differentiation in the market.  Consumers are likely to have differing   13
preferences on the extent to which they value health insurance benefits in this managed form, 
and employers will offer a managed care plan if the product is more desirable for at least a subset 
of consumers within the firm or if it allows them to efficiently segment risks.  Whether the 
availability of a new product increases the likelihood of an employer offering a choice of plans, 
however, depends on the extent to which consumers vary in the value they place on HMOs or 
managed care.  If workers within a firm similarly place high value on the managed care plans, 
employers are likely to replace their existing coverage with the new product, rather than offering 
a choice of plans, and correspondingly, if workers within a firm similarly prefer non-managed 
care plans, the employer is unlikely to switch.  However, if variation exists among workers 
within the firm in the value they place on this coverage or the employer is using the plan for 
efficient risk segmentation, the employer is likely to offer a choice of plans.   
III. Empirical  Methods 
A.  Empirical Model  
Estimation is based on the following empirical model: 
i i i i X C T ε β β α + + + = 2 1          ( 7 )  
where  i T  represents total compensation per worker in firm i, assuming the number of workers in 
the firm is fixed, Ci is an indicator of whether the employer offers workers a choice of plans 
(n>1) and Xi is a vector of variables which are controls for other exogenous determinants of firm 
level average workers compensation.  This empirical framework can also be used to examine the 
individual components of total compensation:   
i i i i X C W ε β β α + + + = 2 1  
i i i i X C K ε β β α + + + = 2 1  
i i i i X C P ε β β α + + + = 2 1    14
where  i W  is average cash wage,  i K is the average premium, and  L L P
c
i / =  is the proportion of 
workers covered by the employer .  Because the effects of choice on cash wages and average 
premiums cannot be signed a priori based on the theoretical model, the effect of choice on these 
variables is an empirical question.  However, the theoretical framework does predict that firms 
offering a choice of plans cover a greater or equal proportion of workers than if they offered a 
single plan.   
A concern in estimating this model is that unobservable characteristics of firms may 
affect both the generosity of health insurance overall and the decision to offer a choice of plans.  
In addition, the decision to offer a choice of plans may be endogenous with respect to the 
dependent variables measuring total compensation.  For example, firms with high average 
premiums under a traditional plan may be more likely to adopt a choice of plans than those with 
low average premiums.  For these reasons, I use an instrument, an indicator of the availability of 
an HMO in the employer’s county, to generate exogenous variation in the propensity of 
employers to offer a choice of plans to workers.  The instrument is discussed in greater detail in 
section B.  
A. Data   
The primary data source is the 1993 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF) 
Employer Health Insurance Survey (Long and Marquis 1997).  The survey includes 
establishment level data for 22,890 public and private employers in ten states in 1993.  The 
primary advantages of the survey for this analysis are that it was conducted at the establishment 
rather than the firm level, reducing the measurement error associated with a geographically based 
instrument, and during a time of rapid managed care penetration, which affects the validity of the 
instrument.  Survey respondents provided information about the establishment and its workers   15
and relatively detailed information about the health insurance plans offered.  Cantor, Long et al. 
(1995) provide descriptive statistics and information on sampling methods and survey design.   
I exclude 1,516 public establishments and those reporting health insurance is negotiated 
by union contract because these types of establishments may follow an alternative model of 
decision-making.  The study sample is also restricted establishments with greater than 25 
employees and those that offer health insurance to workers.  Establishment size is strongly 
correlated with both the probability of offering health insurance and the probability of offering a 
choice among plans (Figure 1).  These differences suggest that the effect of the availability of 
HMOs on the decision to offer a choice of plans may differ based on establishment size.  
Preliminary testing using multivariate linear probability models revealed that the availability of 
an HMO in the county of the employer did not have a statistically significant effect on the 
probability of offering a choice of plans, conditional on offering health insurance, for 
establishments with 25 or fewer workers.  However, the availability of HMOs did have a positive 
effect on the probability of offering health insurance for these smaller employers, particularly for 
those with 10 or less employees.  These results suggest that the decision to offer a choice of 
plans, and particularly the role of HMO availability in facilitating choice, is most relevant for 
employers with greater than 25 workers.  I eliminate 7,118 establishments not offering health 
insurance and 9,589 establishments with 25 or less employees.  Of the remaining 4,667 
establishments I exclude 118 for missing or invalid data for key study variables, primarily 
industry and state identifiers.   4,549 observations remain in the study sample. 
Dependent Variables 
The focus of the empirical work is the health benefits offered by employers, including 
health insurance premiums and coverage rates.  Although cash wage compensation is an   16
important component of the theoretical analysis, the establishment level survey does provide 
adequate and reliable data to test hypotheses regarding cash wage compensation
4.  As a result, 
measures of total and cash wage compensation are not analyzed in this paper.  Each dependent 
variable is described below. 
Three dependent variables measure premium per covered worker in the establishment and 
the allocation of average spending between employer and employee premium contributions: 
1.  Average premium:  the average premium for plans provided by the employer, weighted 
by the proportion of workers enrolled in each plan and the distribution of enrolled 
workers between single and family coverage. 
2.  Average employer contribution:  the average employer contribution to the premium for 
plans provided by the employer, weighted by the proportion of workers enrolled in each 
plan and the distribution of enrolled workers between single and family coverage. 
3.  Average employee contribution:  the average employee contribution to the premium for 
plans provided by the employer, weighted by the proportion of workers enrolled in each 
plan and the distribution of enrolled workers between single and family coverage. 
The variables above include information on both the generosity of the plans offered by 
the employer based on plan characteristics as well as employee coverage decisions regarding 
dependents.  In order to isolate plan from coverage generosity, I estimate models using two 
measures of plan generosity.  The first measures employer spending on premiums independent of 
employee coverage decisions.  The second controls for potential differences across plans in 
                                                 
4 The survey does provide information on the distribution of worker wages based on four broad categories.  
However, in establishments offering health insurance, over 40% of workers fall into the highest wage category, 
making it unlikely that this variable will allow me to capture small effects on the wage distribution.  Another 
candidate variable is total annual payroll combined with total annual labor hours.  However, the median value of 
payroll per hour for establishments in the sample is over $200, raising questions regarding the validity of the 
reported values.     17
characteristics that affect the generosity of coverage.  The objective of this variable is to isolate 
competitive effects on premiums from potential changes in plan generosity related to offering a 
choice of plans. 
4.  Average single premium:  the average premium for plans provided by the employer 
assuming all workers are enrolled in single coverage of each plan, weighted by the 
proportion of workers enrolled in each plan. 
5.  Average standardized premium:  the average of the premium for single coverage, holding 
plan generosity constant, weighted by the proportion of workers enrolled in each plan.  
Premiums are standardized using a regression model of the relationship between plan 
characteristics and employer characteristics and plan premiums for single coverage.  The 
model is estimated on plan level data including 19,031 plans offered by employers 
included in the RWJF survey using ordinary least squares.  A standardized premium was 
calculated for each plan by predicting the premium holding the plan characteristics 
constant at the mean in the sample.  The average standardized premium is the average of 
these predicted values for each employer.  Appendix Tables 1 and 2 present descriptive 
statistics and the results of the estimation.  
A key hypothesis from the theoretical model is that offering a choice of plans increases 
the proportion of workers in a firm covered by the health insurance offered by the employer.  
The following dependent variables test this and also directly examine shifts between single and 
family coverage: 
6.  Proportion covered:  the proportion of employees covered by the plans offered by the 
employer.   18
7.  Proportion family coverage:  the proportion of covered employees enrolled in family 
coverage. 
Finally, I examine variables describing employer contribution policies to identify a 
mechanism for observed coverage changes: 
8.  Full contribution –single coverage:  Indicator of whether the employer contributes the full 
premium for single coverage for at least one plan. 
9.  Full contribution-family coverage:  Indicator of whether the employer contributes the full 
premium for family coverage for at least one plan. 
  Summary statistics for dependent variables are presented in table 1.   
Independent Variables 
The study variable of primary interest is the indicator of whether the establishment offers 
a choice among health plans.  The models also include a set of exogenous firm and market 
characteristics to control for other factors that contribute to differences across establishments in 
employee compensation.  Establishment controls include establishment size (categorical 
indicators 1-10, 11-25, 26-50, 51-100, 101-250, and >250 employees), whether the establishment 
is part of a larger nationwide organization (to control for economies of scale in the purchase of 
health insurance and employee compensation), for-profit status, and the distribution of the 
workforce by age and sex.  The survey collects information on the proportion of workers falling 
into three age categories:  <25 years, 25-54 years, and 55 and older by sex.  Using these 
variables, I also construct a measure of heterogeneity in preferences for coverage among workers 
in the firm based on their predicted health expenditures, an estimate of the coefficient of 
variation of predicted health expenditures (Bundorf 2000).  In some models, I include the wage 
distribution of workers in the firm to control for differences in demand for coverage across   19
establishments.  Because these variables are likely to be endogenous, however, I exclude them 
from most specifications.  Market controls include the county population, the county per capita 
income, the HCFA wage index and characteristics of the medical market including percent of 
county discharges that were financed by Medicaid and the number of inpatient-hospitals in the 
county offering residency programs.  All models also include state (10) and industry (9) fixed 
effects.  Descriptive Statistics are presented in Table 2. 
Instrumental Variables 
As discussed earlier, the effect of choice in the empirical model is likely to be biased by 
differences in unobserved characteristics between establishments offering and those not offering 
a choice of plans as well as the endogeneity of choice with respect to premiums.  I address these 
issues by instrumenting for the propensity of employers to offer a choice of plans with an 
indicator of whether an HMO is available in the county of the establishment.  I hypothesize that 
the availability of an HMO creates an alternative coverage choice, which allows employers to 
more effectively segment workers based on preferences for health care and health insurance than 
variations in cost sharing in a traditional indemnity plan. The identifying assumptions are that the 
availability of managed care lowers the cost to the employer of offering a choice among plans 
and that the entry of managed care organizations into a market is independent of the 
characteristics of the employers in that market.   One potential weakness of this strategy is that 
demand for HMOs differs across counties and the availability of managed care plans represents 
differences in the average demand across firms in the county rather than random variation in 
HMO location choices.  The year of the data used in the analysis addresses this issue somewhat.  
Managed care penetration was increasing rapidly during this period.  In 1991, 60% of countries 
had at least one HMO serving the country (Table 3).  By 1996, this had grown to 93%.  I propose   20
that the rapid entry during these years was conducted independent of employee demand for 
health insurance within individual firms.  Managed care organizations were not able to 
accurately assess systematic differences across markets in employee preferences for coverage 
and instead made decisions based on factors such as market size and the existing organization of 
providers.  In line with this hypothesis, I estimate an additional set of models restricting my 
analysis to markets in which an HMO had entered by 1996, suggesting that the market was 
ultimately attractive to HMOs.   
C.  Model estimation 
All models are estimated using either ordinary least squares or two stage least squares.  
The first stage models are linear probability models, which will produce consistent estimates 
using two stage least squares (Heckman 1978).   Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are 
calculated for all models presented (White 1980). 
 
IV. Results 
Thirty-seven percent of establishments in the study sample offered a choice of plans 
(Table 1).  Average health insurance premiums were higher in firms offering a choice of plans 
($257) than those offering a single plan ($244).  Employers offering a choice of plans, however, 
also made larger contributions to the plan premium ($177) than those offering a single plan 
($163), with the result that average employee contributions were similar between the two types 
of firms.  The average monthly premium assuming all employees were enrolled in single 
coverage of their chosen plan was also similar between the two types of firms ($143).  Holding 
plan generosity constant, however, plan premiums were higher for firms offering a choice of 
plans were higher in establishments offering plan choice ($143) than those offering a single plan   21
($140).  This is consistent with the proposition that firms choosing to offer a choice of plans 
were those facing higher average premiums due to factors such as the composition of the 
workforce or local health care costs.  Both the proportion of employees covered (0.71 vs 0.60) 
and the proportion of enrollees with family coverage (0.47 vs 0.45) were higher in 
establishments offering a choice of plans.  Establishments offering a choice of plans were also 
more likely to fully contribute to at least one plan in the case of both single and family coverage.   
These results are consistent with employers offering a choice of plans offering more 
generous benefits in general.  Employers offering a choice of plans cover a higher proportion of 
employees and provide family coverage to a greater proportion of covered workers.  In addition, 
they are more likely to offer a plan requiring no employee contribution to the plan premium.  
Although average premiums for single coverage are similar between employers offering a choice 
of plans and those offering a single plan, adjusting for plan generosity indicates that underlying 
premiums are actually higher for employers offering a choice.  This indicates that the plans in 
which workers enroll in these establishments are actually less generous based on their observable 
plan characteristics.     
In the first stage regression, the indicator of whether an HMO is available in the 
establishment’s county has a large, positive and statistically significant effect on the probability 
of offering a choice among plans (Table 4).  The availability of an HMO in the country of the 
establishment increases the likelihood that the employer offers a choice of plans by 14 
percentage points in the full sample (Table 4-Models 1 and 2) and 15 percentage points in the 
subsample based on the future availability of an HMO in the establishment’s county (Table 4-
Models 3 and 4).  Including the wage distribution of workers in the firm as controls for variation 
across establishments in demand for health insurance has virtually no effect on the magnitude or   22
statistical significance of the effect of HMO availability, reducing concerns of omitted variables 
measuring worker demand for coverage.  As anticipated, establishment size is highly correlated 
with the probability of offering a choice of plans.  Establishments with more employees and 
establishments that are part of a larger firm are more likely to offer a choice among plans.  
Variation in workers preferences for coverage as proxied by variation in expected health 
expenditures is also positively correlated with the decision to offer a choice of plans as expected.    
The results of the models for average premium indicate that offering a choice of plans 
reduced the average premium paid by employers for workers and that the primary mechanism for 
the reduction was an associated shift from family to single coverage.  The point estimates of the 
effect of offering a choice of plans using OLS are small and not statistically significant (Table 5, 
Models 1-3).  The effect of choice on average premium in the instrumented model, however, is 
large, negative and statistically significant (Table 5, Models 4 and 6).  In these models, offering a 
choice of plans reduces the average premium for employer-sponsored coverage by $85 to $100.  
Although this seems implausibly large at first glance, the results from Models 5 and 6 suggest 
that most of the effect was driven by a shift from family to single coverage.  Controlling for the 
proportion of employees enrolled in family coverage, the magnitude of the effect of choice 
declines substantially and becomes statistically insignificant at conventional levels.  In Models 5 
and 6, the proportion of workers enrolled in an HMO does not have a statistically significant 
effect on the average premium within an employer-sponsored group.  
Tables 6 and 7 examine the allocation of these premium reductions between employee 
and employer premium contributions.  OLS results reveal a small, statistically insignificant 
positive effect of choice on both employee and employer premium contributions.  IV estimates, 
in contrast, reveal larger negative effects on both employer and employee contributions.    23
However, the negative effect is only statistically significant in the model of the employer 
contribution using the full sample (Table 6 – Model 4).  In the instrumented models, controlling 
for the proportion enrolled in family coverage generally reduces the magnitude of the point 
estimate of the effect of choice on both employee and employer premium contributions, although 
the effect is larger for employer contributions (Tables 6 and 7 – Models 5 and 6).  Comparing the 
magnitude of the decline in contributions in the employee and employer premium contribution 
models with those of the average premium model, I find that between 65 and 75% of the decline 
in premiums was in the form of declining employer contributions.  The remainder was passed on 
to employees directly in the form of lower premium contributions.  Offering a choice of plans 
does not have a statistically significant effect on the average employer share of the premium for 
covered workers (Table 8).  In the instrumented models, the point estimates are positive (Table 8 
– Models 4 and 6), indicating that employers contributed a higher proportion of the plan 
premium in firms offering a choice of plans, although once again, these effects are not 
statistically significant. 
I control for the effects of changes in premiums driven by changes in coverage by 
calculating average premiums assuming single coverage for all employees enrolled in a plan.  
Using OLS, I find the offering a choice of plans was associated with a small reduction in average 
premiums, about $5 (Table 8 – Models 1 and 2).  Much of the reduction can be explained by a 
shift to HMO enrollment (Model 3).  The magnitude of the negative effect is larger, however, 
using instrumental variables.  In the full sample, offering choice reduces the average premium 
for single coverage by $41, and controlling for the proportion enrolled in an HMO has little 
effect on the estimate.  Although these seems implausibly large given the average in the data for 
the average premium assuming single coverage is $143, it is important to consider that these   24
estimates do not control for differences in the generosity of the plans offered.  For example, 
employers adding an HMO to a more traditional FFS plan may increase the cost sharing of the 
FFS plan to induce employees to enroll in the HMO.  These types of changes would presumably 
be reflected as changes in the premium for the affected plan. 
The results in Table 10 suggest that these types of changes in the generosity of plans may 
take place when firms offer a choice of plans to workers.  The dependent variable in these 
models is the average premium, holding plan generosity constant, for covered employees 
assuming all employees are enrolled in single coverage of a particular plan.  In this case, I find 
that offering a choice of plans has virtually no effect on average standardized premiums.  The 
point estimates are small relative to the mean of the dependent variable ($141) and generally 
statistically insignificant.  These results suggest that the negative effects of average premiums for 
single coverage were largely driven by corresponding changes in plan generosity.  Similarly, 
they provide no evidence that offering a choice of plans drives reductions in plan premiums 
through competitive effects.  
The results suggest that offering a choice of plans increases the proportion of workers in 
a firm covered by health insurance (Table 11).  Using OLS, offering a choice of plans is 
associated with an increase of 5 percentage points in the proportion of workers in the 
establishment covered by health insurance (Table 11 – Models 1 and 2).  This is true even after 
controlling for the wage distribution of workers.  Using IV, the estimates are of similar 
magnitude and direction, unlike the results for the other dimensions of employer health benefit 
offerings.  However, the estimates are less precisely estimated and are not statistically significant 
(Table 11 – Models 3 and 4).      25
Although offering choice is associated with an increase in the proportion of employees 
within an establishment covered by health insurance, IV estimates suggest that it is also 
associated with a significant shift from single to family coverage among covered workers (Table 
12).  Using OLS, offering a choice is associated with a 2 percentage point increase in the 
proportion of covered workers enrolled in family coverage (Table 12 – Models 1 and 2).  
However, IV estimates suggest significant, approximately 20 percentage point, declines in the 
proportion of workers enrolled in family coverage.   The results in Table 13 indicate a possible 
mechanism for the dramatic declines.  The dependent variables in this analysis are whether the 
employer contributes fully to at least one single coverage plan and at least one family coverage 
plan.  Using OLS, employers offering a choice of plans were 8 percentage points more likely to 
fully contribute to at least one single coverage plan (Table 13- Model 1) and 4 percentage points 
more likely to fully contribute to a family coverage plan (Table 13- Model 4).  However, using 
instrumental variables, the magnitude of the effect of choice on the probability of offering the 
full contribution single plan was much higher – over 20 percentage points, while the effect of 
offering a choice of plans on the probability of fully contributing to a plan providing family 
coverage was negative – between 2 and 6 percentage points.  The IV estimates, however, are 
imprecisely estimated and thus can only be considered suggestive. 
 
V.  Conclusions 
The prevalence of health plan choice within employment-based purchasing groups has 
increased over the last two decades.  This results of this analysis of the effects of offering a 
choice among plans within employment-based purchasing groups are more consistent with a 
model of employers choosing to offer a choice of plans in response to heterogeneity among   26
workers in their preferences for health insurance than with the objective of generating 
competition to reduce the premiums and increase the quality of the health plans they provide.  I 
find that the availability of health plan choice was associated with an increase in the proportion 
of workers in a firm covered by the health insurance offered by the employer and reduction in 
average premiums for employer-sponsored coverage.  Premium reductions, however, took place 
primarily through reductions in the generosity of coverage received by employees, both in the 
form of less generous plans and fewer workers within a firm enrolling in family coverage.  I find 
no evidence that the availability of choice among plans generated premium reductions through 
greater competition among health plans for enrollees within the firm. 
The analysis also indicates the importance of generating exogenous variation in 
determinants of employer choices, in this case the decision to offer a multiple plans, to examine 
the effects of these choices on workers.  In this analysis, I use the availability of an HMO in the 
county of the employer as an instrument for offering a choice of plans.  While the results for the 
effects of choice on the proportion of workers covered by the employer were consistent between 
the OLS and IV models, many of the other results were not.  In particular, the findings regarding 
reductions in both plan and coverage generosity associated with health plan choice were specific 
to the IV estimation.  The opposite conclusions would have been drawn using OLS.  This could 
potentially be driven by both unobserved characteristics of workers or firms positively affecting 
both the generosity of the benefits offered by the employer and compensation more generally and 
the decision of the employer to offer choice or the endogeneity of the decision to offer a choice 
of plans with respect to employer spending on health insurance.  Employers characterized by 
higher average premiums for reasons independent of the generosity of the plans they offered may   27
have been more likely to offer a choice of plans in response.  Either case would result in a 
positive relationship between choice and premiums using OLS. 
Overall, the findings indicate that gains in employee coverage were offset by both 
declines in the generosity of plans offered by employers and losses in dependent coverage.  The 
implications for the welfare of consumers are dependent upon the extent to which consumers 
valued the lost benefits as well as the extent to which they were compensated for their loss.  For 
example, reductions in plan generosity, such as the switch from a FFS plan to an HMO or an 
increase in cost sharing, may represent either a reduction in highly valued benefits or a 
movement away from inefficiently high levels of coverage.  Workers gaining coverage are likely 
to be better off, particularly if they were previously uninsured.  In the case of declines in 
dependent coverage, the welfare implications depend on the extent to which dependents had 
access to coverage from alternative sources.  If these declines primarily targeted dual-working 
families who were enrolled in potentially duplicative plans, this may have had positive welfare 
implications.  If those who lost dependent coverage were able to find it from an alternative 
employer or public source, the changes represent a transfer rather than an inefficiency.  
However, for those who lost coverage and went uninsured, the change was ultimately welfare 
reducing.   
For reductions in both plan and coverage generosity, the net effect for individual workers 
also depends upon whether they coincided for corresponding increases in cash wages or other 
fringe benefits.  While one mechanism for transferring compensation to workers is by reducing 
employee premium contributions, the results do not indicate that employers passed the bulk of 
the premium on to employees in the form of higher employer contributions to plan premiums.    28
However, we were unable to directly examine the effects of changes in benefits on cash wages, 
either at the level of the establishment or the level of the individual.   
In addition, it is important to note that the changes observed in the instrumented models, 
particularly in the case of the declines in family coverage, may not have been a direct result of 
offering health plan choice, but rather driven by underlying changes in the health care market 
that coincided with or even drove the diffusion of managed care.  For example, rising health care 
costs may have created pressure for employers to reduce health benefit costs.  This may have 
been accomplished by two strategies, a shift to managed care and a reduction in contributions to 
dependents. 
The findings of this study make three important contributions to the literature on health 
plan choice.  First, they provide greater support for the decision of employers to offer a choice of 
health plans as a response to heterogeneity among employees in their preferences for health 
insurance than an explicit strategy to foster within-firm competition among plans for enrollees.  
Similarly, the results are not consistent with widespread adverse selection in response to 
employers offering workers a choice among plans.  The availability of choice was associated 
with an increase, rather than a decline, in the proportion of workers in an establishment covered 
by the health insurance offered by the employer.  Although the availability of choice appears not 
to be driving declines in within firm coverage rates due to adverse selection, it is possible that 
choice is welfare reducing for some workers if, for example, they are enrolled in a managed care 
plan when they would prefer an alternative type of plan.  This, however, is not consistent with 
literature indicating that those enrolled in HMOs who faced a choice of plans are more satisfied 
with their coverage than those not facing a choice.  Finally, the results highlight the importance 
of considering household decision making when evaluating the effects of employer decisions.    29
Our results indicate that many employees responded to the availability of choice from an 
employer by dropping coverage for dependents.  Yet, evaluating the implications of this requires 
more information on the coverage alternatives available to dependents and their ultimate choices.References: 
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Table 1:  Dependent Variables by Offer of Choice
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Average Premium 248.74 104.18 243.82 110.17 257.09 92.56 ***
Average Employer Contribution 168.51 99.91 163.30 104.02 177.36 91.87 ***
Average Employee Contribution 80.23 71.20 80.52 76.57 79.73 61.02
Average Employer Share 0.67 0.24 0.66 0.25 0.68 0.21 ***
Average Premium-Single Coverage 143.07 54.75 143.46 60.01 142.40 44.43
Average Premium - Standardized 141.48 15.44 140.37 15.45 143.36 15.25 ***
Proportion Covered 0.64 0.30 0.60 0.31 0.71 0.27 ***
Proportion Family Coverage 0.46 0.25 0.45 0.27 0.47 0.22 ***
Full Contribution Single Coverage 0.41 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.46 0.50 ***
Full Contribution Family Coverage 0.15 0.36 0.13 0.34 0.18 0.39 ***
N
%








Table 2:  Independent Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev
Offers a Choice of Plans 0.37 0.48
Proportion Enrolled in Family Coverage 0.46 0.25
Proportion Enrolled in HMO 0.20 0.35
26-50 employees 0.40 0.49
51-100 employees 0.26 0.44
101-250 employees 0.21 0.41
250+ employees 0.12 0.33
Part of a larger firm 0.55 0.50
For Profit 0.84 0.37
% Wage < $10,000 11.87 22.64
% Wage $10-14,000 22.55 24.27
% Wage $14-20,000 23.39 21.42
% Wage >$20,000 42.23 33.95
Health Expenditure Variation 0.37 0.10
% Male <25 years 0.12 0.15
% Male 25-54 0.37 0.25
% Male >=55 0.04 0.06
% Female <25 years 0.11 0.13
% Female 25-54 0.32 0.23
% Female >=55 0.04 0.06
County Population 10,000s 46.89 51.23
County Per Capita Income 1,000s 21.42 6.90
County per capita Medicaid discharges 18.28 11.96
Teaching Hospitals 2.90 3.65
HMO Available in County-93 0.88 0.33
CMS wage index 96.49 15.42
Agriculture/Forestry & Fisheries 0.01 0.11
Construction 0.03 0.18
Mining and Manufacturing 0.20 0.40
Transportation/Communications/Other Public Utilities 0.06 0.23
Wholesale Trade 0.07 0.25
Retail Trade 0.20 0.40
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate 0.14 0.35
Professional Services 0.24 0.42




New Mexico 0.11 0.31
New York 0.10 0.30








Table 3:  Diffusion of Managed Care, 1991-1996
Average Number 
of HMOs serving 
a County








Data Source:  Interstudy Directories (1991-1996) 
Table 4:  Effect of HMO Availability on Offer of Health Plan Choice
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
HMO Available in County-93 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.150*** 0.151***
[0.020] [0.020] [0.021] [0.021]
% Wage < $10,000 -0.001*** -0.001***
[0.000] [0.000]
% Wage $10-14,000 -0.001*** -0.001***
[0.000] [0.000]
% Wage $14-20,000 -0.001 -0.001*
[0.000] [0.000]
51-100 employees 0.080*** 0.081*** 0.083*** 0.083***
[0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.017]
101-250 employees 0.169*** 0.170*** 0.169*** 0.170***
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019]
250+ employees 0.335*** 0.330*** 0.337*** 0.332***
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
Part of a larger firm 0.124*** 0.123*** 0.124*** 0.124***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
For Profit -0.039* -0.042* -0.043* -0.046*
[0.023] [0.023] [0.024] [0.024]
Health Expenditure Variation 0.182** 0.174** 0.181** 0.169**
[0.081] [0.081] [0.082] [0.082]
% Male <25 years -0.018 0.005 -0.021 0.003
[0.052] [0.053] [0.053] [0.053]
% Male >55 0.18 0.186 0.148 0.155
[0.122] [0.123] [0.124] [0.125]
% Female <25 years 0.009 0.05 -0.007 0.036
[0.056] [0.058] [0.057] [0.058]
% Female 25-54 0.077* 0.086** 0.083* 0.093**
[0.042] [0.042] [0.043] [0.043]
% Female >55 0.061 0.091 0.082 0.114
[0.123] [0.123] [0.126] [0.127]
County Population 10,000s 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
County Per Capita Income 1,000s 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
County per capita Medicaid discharges -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Teaching Hospitals 0.014** 0.014** 0.015** 0.015**
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
CMS wage index 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Constant -0.029 0.016 -0.025 0.024
[0.077] [0.079] [0.079] [0.080]
Observations 4549 4549 4399 4399
R-squared 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All models include industry and state fixed effects
Full Sample HMO Available in 1996 
Table 5:  Effect of Choice on Average Premiums
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Offers Choice 4.878 3.789 2.621 -101.282** -53.874 -87.145** -39.035
[3.359] [3.352] [2.883] [43.080] [44.105] [42.850] [45.145]
% with family coverage 235.188*** 242.310*** 240.302***
[6.142] [8.508] [8.873]
% enrolled in HMO -19.401*** 1.843 -4.033
[3.268] [17.002] [17.320]
% Wage < $10,000 -0.178**
[0.082]
% Wage $10-14,000 -0.429***
[0.063]
% Wage $14-20,000 -0.195**
[0.078]
51-100 employees -6.462* -6.002 -6.173** 1.998 -1.797 0.116 -3.586
[3.755] [3.750] [3.037] [5.352] [4.547] [5.386] [4.678]
101-250 employees 1.248 2.014 -3.14 19.538** 5.881 17.012** 3.541
[4.166] [4.138] [3.501] [8.651] [7.725] [8.580] [7.818]
250+ employees 14.162** 13.100** 3.208 49.955*** 20.546 45.600*** 15.861
[5.694] [5.682] [4.984] [15.761] [14.331] [15.769] [14.678]
Part of a larger firm 21.230*** 20.975*** 8.150*** 34.530*** 15.497** 34.288*** 13.972**
[3.255] [3.239] [2.723] [6.453] [6.362] [6.456] [6.509]
For Profit -12.247** -12.847*** -18.210*** -16.355*** -19.879*** -15.938*** -18.926***
[5.008] [4.974] [3.987] [5.728] [4.299] [5.709] [4.321]
Health Expenditure Variation 27.377 25.342 13.104 46.964** 24.143 43.151* 19.808
[19.285] [19.228] [15.940] [22.525] [18.661] [22.484] [18.883]
% Male <25 years -43.552*** -36.703*** -19.844* -45.775*** -19.950* -45.955*** -20.200*
[12.706] [12.705] [10.274] [13.516] [10.467] [13.415] [10.446]
% Male >55 65.704** 65.778** 46.276** 84.790*** 53.660** 78.024*** 49.839**
[26.901] [26.179] [21.565] [30.490] [23.198] [29.986] [22.968]
% Female <25 years -44.413*** -32.489*** -13.023 -43.434*** -12.98 -49.602*** -15.418
[12.301] [12.307] [9.872] [13.694] [10.407] [13.631] [10.557]
% Female 25-54 0.908 5.268 23.570*** 8.52 27.326*** 10.171 27.528***
[9.906] [9.853] [8.258] [11.351] [9.038] [11.505] [9.291]
% Female >55 -48.463* -33.483 -0.011 -43.373 2.168 -37.019 2.805
[25.530] [25.230] [19.995] [28.536] [21.209] [28.865] [21.629]
County Population 10,000s 0.03 0.018 0.04 0.051 0.046 0.034 0.042
[0.091] [0.091] [0.077] [0.100] [0.081] [0.099] [0.080]
County Per Capita Income 1,000s 0.346 0.177 0.751* 0.517 0.961** 0.396 0.854**
[0.459] [0.459] [0.390] [0.498] [0.428] [0.493] [0.432]
County per capita Medicaid discharges 0.455* 0.459* 0.02 -0.002 -0.169 0.016 -0.117
[0.251] [0.250] [0.206] [0.332] [0.255] [0.332] [0.259]
Teaching Hospitals -1.989 -1.895 -0.459 -0.142 0.24 -0.142 0.101
[1.425] [1.418] [1.209] [1.762] [1.369] [1.733] [1.354]
CMS wage index 0.453** 0.424** 0.580*** 0.587*** 0.588*** 0.644*** 0.612***
[0.199] [0.200] [0.171] [0.225] [0.178] [0.222] [0.178]
Constant 179.964*** 197.459*** 73.744*** 180.205*** 67.100*** 175.194*** 66.936***
[18.391] [18.726] [15.139] [19.935] [16.361] [19.792] [16.255]
Observations 4549 4549 4549 4549 4549 4399 4399
R-squared 0.06 0.07 0.36 0.3 0.32
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
all models include state and industry fixed effects
OLS IV




Table 6:  Effect of Choice on Average Employer Premium Contributions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Offers Choice 1.317 0.08 2.607 -73.657* -31.254 -57.056 -11.728
[3.170] [3.157] [2.964] [39.080] [44.041] [38.662] [44.847]
% with family coverage 160.449*** 164.718*** 160.831***
[6.594] [8.739] [8.980]
% enrolled in HMO -26.797*** -14.064 -21.733
[3.597] [16.950] [17.202]
% Wage < $10,000 -0.198**
[0.078]
% Wage $10-14,000 -0.480***
[0.059]
% Wage $14-20,000 -0.298***
[0.074]
51-100 employees -5.101 -4.697 -5.049 0.874 -2.426 -0.862 -4.277
[3.563] [3.550] [3.215] [4.919] [4.710] [4.928] [4.824]
101-250 employees 2.295 3.138 -0.833 15.212* 4.574 12.395 1.636
[3.907] [3.870] [3.614] [7.929] [7.943] [7.871] [8.053]
250+ employees 18.641*** 17.453*** 11.056** 43.919*** 21.448 39.210*** 16.013
[5.133] [5.112] [4.719] [14.488] [14.556] [14.448] [14.897]
Part of a larger firm 22.056*** 21.701*** 12.360*** 31.449*** 16.764*** 30.088*** 14.213**
[3.024] [3.000] [2.799] [5.740] [6.221] [5.726] [6.362]
For Profit -27.876*** -28.660*** -32.267*** -30.777*** -33.267*** -29.848*** -31.977***
[4.916] [4.858] [4.403] [5.313] [4.564] [5.297] [4.616]
Health Expenditure Variation 19.813 17.121 8.896 33.646 15.512 29.933 10.843
[18.898] [18.940] [17.334] [20.938] [19.458] [20.899] [19.711]
% Male <25 years -35.929*** -28.318** -19.919* -37.500*** -19.982* -38.226*** -20.961*
[12.062] [12.044] [11.280] [12.441] [11.342] [12.354] [11.378]
% Male >55 59.615** 59.228** 47.202* 73.094*** 51.627** 67.737** 48.856*
[27.878] [27.347] [25.079] [27.841] [25.066] [28.115] [25.692]
% Female <25 years -43.997*** -31.359*** -21.722** -43.306*** -21.696** -49.152*** -24.890**
[11.981] [12.028] [10.821] [12.706] [10.993] [12.634] [11.171]
% Female 25-54 -9.019 -4.33 6.844 -3.643 9.096 -3.122 8.316
[9.633] [9.588] [8.828] [10.591] [9.476] [10.785] [9.814]
% Female >55 -58.272** -41.547* -24.114 -54.677** -22.808 -51.319** -23.593
[23.961] [23.704] [20.644] [25.491] [21.007] [25.790] [21.561]
County Population 10,000s -0.004 -0.019 0.005 0.011 0.009 0 0.007
[0.085] [0.084] [0.079] [0.090] [0.081] [0.089] [0.080]
County Per Capita Income 1,000s -0.061 -0.261 0.144 0.06 0.27 -0.027 0.164
[0.484] [0.482] [0.442] [0.501] [0.465] [0.498] [0.469]
County per capita Medicaid discharges 0.314 0.314 -0.013 -0.009 -0.126 0.017 -0.076
[0.245] [0.244] [0.220] [0.305] [0.261] [0.305] [0.265]
Teaching Hospitals -0.924 -0.806 0.275 0.381 0.694 0.257 0.486
[1.331] [1.324] [1.229] [1.575] [1.351] [1.548] [1.341]
CMS wage index 0.863*** 0.833*** 0.987*** 0.958*** 0.992*** 0.974*** 0.995***
[0.194] [0.195] [0.182] [0.212] [0.184] [0.211] [0.186]
Constant 80.967*** 102.664*** 10.705 81.137*** 6.722 79.183*** 9.752
[17.569] [17.888] [15.962] [18.348] [17.131] [18.245] [17.108]
Observations 4549 4549 4549 4549 4549 4399 4399
R-squared 0.08 0.09 0.24 0.22 0.01 0.23
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
all models include state and industry fixed effects
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Table 7:  Effect of Choice on Average Employee Premium Contributions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Offers Choice 3.561 3.709 0.014 -27.625 -22.621 -30.089 -27.308
[2.312] [2.320] [2.324] [27.755] [34.742] [27.851] [35.322]
% with family coverage 74.739*** 77.592*** 79.471***
[5.448] [6.728] [6.969]
% enrolled in HMO 7.396*** 15.907 17.699
[2.846] [13.473] [13.665]
% Wage < $10,000 0.019
[0.058]
% Wage $10-14,000 0.051
[0.047]
% Wage $14-20,000 0.103**
[0.053]
51-100 employees -1.361 -1.305 -1.124 1.124 0.63 0.977 0.692
[2.698] [2.703] [2.608] [3.520] [3.766] [3.633] [3.911]
101-250 employees -1.047 -1.124 -2.307 4.326 1.307 4.617 1.905
[2.978] [2.976] [2.882] [5.673] [6.278] [5.683] [6.332]
250+ employees -4.479 -4.352 -7.848** 6.036 -0.901 6.39 -0.153
[3.651] [3.660] [3.614] [9.893] [11.120] [10.009] [11.384]
Part of a larger firm -0.826 -0.726 -4.210* 3.081 -1.266 4.2 -0.241
[2.261] [2.266] [2.187] [4.145] [5.046] [4.228] [5.192]
For Profit 15.629*** 15.813*** 14.057*** 14.423*** 13.388*** 13.910*** 13.051***
[3.622] [3.641] [3.525] [3.795] [3.634] [3.918] [3.744]
Health Expenditure Variation 7.564 8.221 4.208 13.318 8.631 13.218 8.965
[13.555] [13.549] [13.028] [14.850] [14.925] [15.107] [15.242]
% Male <25 years -7.622 -8.385 0.075 -8.276 0.033 -7.729 0.76
[9.321] [9.447] [8.854] [9.464] [8.891] [9.599] [9.023]
% Male >55 6.089 6.55 -0.926 11.696 2.033 10.287 0.983
[19.545] [19.664] [18.947] [21.514] [20.250] [21.912] [20.675]
% Female <25 years -0.415 -1.13 8.699 -0.128 8.716 -0.451 9.471
[8.591] [8.805] [8.311] [8.775] [8.420] [9.055] [8.747]
% Female 25-54 9.927 9.598 16.725** 12.163* 18.230*** 13.292* 19.212***
[6.676] [6.698] [6.492] [7.084] [6.917] [7.357] [7.238]
% Female >55 9.809 8.064 24.103 11.304 24.976 14.3 26.398
[18.311] [18.352] [18.039] [18.795] [18.344] [19.533] [19.101]
County Population 10,000s 0.034 0.037 0.035 0.041 0.038 0.034 0.036
[0.067] [0.067] [0.064] [0.068] [0.065] [0.069] [0.066]
County Per Capita Income 1,000s 0.407 0.438 0.607** 0.457 0.691** 0.423 0.690**
[0.297] [0.297] [0.297] [0.307] [0.330] [0.314] [0.340]
County per capita Medicaid discharges 0.141 0.145 0.033 0.007 -0.043 -0.001 -0.041
[0.171] [0.171] [0.167] [0.212] [0.205] [0.219] [0.212]
Teaching Hospitals -1.065 -1.088 -0.734 -0.522 -0.454 -0.399 -0.386
[0.990] [0.992] [0.960] [1.123] [1.063] [1.137] [1.077]
CMS wage index -0.410*** -0.410*** -0.408*** -0.370*** -0.404*** -0.330** -0.383***
[0.136] [0.136] [0.132] [0.143] [0.134] [0.145] [0.137]
Constant 98.997*** 94.795*** 63.040*** 99.068*** 60.377*** 96.011*** 57.184***
[12.490] [12.685] [11.861] [12.716] [12.619] [12.914] [12.689]
Observations 4549 4549 4549 4549 4549 4399 4399
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.07
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
all models include state and industry fixed effects
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Table 8:  Effect of Choice on Average Employer Share
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Offers Choice -0.007 -0.009 0.004 0.066 0.13 0.078 0.149
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.091] [0.119] [0.092] [0.122]
% with family coverage 0.011 -0.005 -0.012
[0.017] [0.022] [0.023]
% enrolled in HMO -0.051*** -0.098** -0.106**
[0.011] [0.047] [0.048]
% Wage < $10,000 -0.001***
[0.000]
% Wage $10-14,000 -0.001***
[0.000]
% Wage $14-20,000 -0.001***
[0.000]
51-100 employees -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.013 -0.018 -0.014 -0.02
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.012] [0.013] [0.012] [0.014]
101-250 employees 0.005 0.006 0.005 -0.007 -0.016 -0.01 -0.019
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.019] [0.022] [0.019] [0.022]
250+ employees 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.01 -0.006 0.006 -0.011
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.033] [0.038] [0.033] [0.040]
Part of a larger firm 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.030*** 0.024* 0.013 0.022 0.01
[0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.014] [0.017] [0.014] [0.018]
For Profit -0.080*** -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.077*** -0.078*** -0.077*** -0.078***
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013]
Health Expenditure Variation 0.022 0.015 0.017 0.009 -0.008 0.009 -0.009
[0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.050] [0.053] [0.051] [0.054]
% Male <25 years -0.028 -0.013 -0.027 -0.026 -0.027 -0.027 -0.028
[0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031]
% Male >55 0.062 0.063 0.065 0.049 0.048 0.049 0.051
[0.065] [0.065] [0.064] [0.069] [0.071] [0.071] [0.072]
% Female <25 years -0.060* -0.037 -0.055* -0.060* -0.055* -0.067** -0.061*
[0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.033] [0.034]
% Female 25-54 -0.031 -0.025 -0.029 -0.037 -0.037 -0.039 -0.041
[0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.025] [0.026] [0.026] [0.027]
% Female >55 -0.089 -0.065 -0.082 -0.092 -0.087 -0.097 -0.093
[0.062] [0.062] [0.062] [0.062] [0.063] [0.064] [0.066]
County Population 10,000s 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
County Per Capita Income 1,000s -0.001 -0.002* -0.002 -0.001 -0.002* -0.001 -0.002*
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
County per capita Medicaid discharges 0 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Teaching Hospitals 0.001 0.001 0.002 0 0 0 0
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
CMS wage index 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Constant
0.533*** 0.575*** 0.536*** 0.533*** 0.551*** 0.538*** 0.560***
Observations [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.046] [0.044] [0.047]
R-squared 4549 4549 4549 4549 4549 4399 4399
Robust standard errors in brackets 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.04 0
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
all models include state and industry fixed effects
OLS IV




Table 9:  Effect of Choice on Average Premiums - Single Coverage
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Offers Choice -5.291*** -5.426*** -2.181 -41.150** -40.737 -31.789 -27.85
[1.807] [1.805] [1.806] [20.870] [27.617] [20.657] [27.450]
% enrolled in HMO -14.903*** -0.621 -5.71
[1.973] [10.491] [10.335]
% Wage < $10,000 0.005
[0.041]
% Wage $10-14,000 -0.077**
[0.036]
% Wage $14-20,000 -0.03
[0.038]
51-100 employees -3.08 -3.01 -3.240* -0.222 -0.252 -0.932 -1.214
[1.909] [1.910] [1.904] [2.521] [2.847] [2.563] [2.891]
101-250 employees -2.391 -2.245 -2.539 3.788 3.733 2.43 1.907
[2.233] [2.231] [2.227] [4.172] [4.947] [4.135] [4.901]
250+ employees 0.257 0.185 0.134 12.347* 12.246 9.2 8.212
[3.054] [3.052] [3.042] [7.421] [8.945] [7.345] [8.905]
Part of a larger firm 5.964*** 5.904*** 5.115*** 10.457*** 10.386** 9.174*** 8.491**
[1.739] [1.742] [1.734] [3.142] [4.151] [3.115] [4.134]
For Profit -9.649*** -9.662*** -10.003*** -11.037*** -11.041*** -10.454*** -10.493***
[2.701] [2.707] [2.682] [2.881] [2.867] [2.898] [2.857]
Health Expenditure Variation 8.061 7.896 6.764 14.677 14.571 12.302 11.262
[9.220] [9.244] [9.258] [10.415] [11.104] [10.326] [11.018]
% Male <25 years -17.233*** -16.552*** -17.412*** -17.984*** -17.985*** -16.996*** -16.987***
[6.159] [6.204] [6.188] [6.382] [6.379] [6.316] [6.294]
% Male >55 32.734** 32.427** 33.657** 39.181** 39.168** 36.349** 36.344**
[14.288] [14.276] [14.334] [15.741] [15.786] [15.598] [15.527]
% Female <25 years -2.036 -0.868 -1.09 -1.705 -1.668 -2.716 -2.301
[6.066] [6.124] [6.061] [6.422] [6.453] [6.451] [6.488]
% Female 25-54 14.481*** 15.169*** 14.924*** 17.053*** 17.051*** 17.508*** 17.454***
[4.895] [4.913] [4.877] [5.337] [5.340] [5.418] [5.410]
% Female >55 17.851 20.402 19.064 19.571 19.608 20.438 20.76
[12.437] [12.430] [12.417] [13.285] [13.185] [13.490] [13.290]
County Population 10,000s 0.029 0.027 0.032 0.036 0.036 0.032 0.032
[0.049] [0.049] [0.048] [0.051] [0.051] [0.051] [0.050]
County Per Capita Income 1,000s 0.466* 0.443* 0.388 0.524* 0.520* 0.487* 0.452
[0.263] [0.263] [0.262] [0.269] [0.280] [0.269] [0.278]
County per capita Medicaid discharges 0.004 0.002 -0.029 -0.15 -0.151 -0.115 -0.117
[0.125] [0.126] [0.125] [0.152] [0.151] [0.154] [0.151]
Teaching Hospitals -0.64 -0.621 -0.47 -0.016 -0.014 -0.119 -0.099
[0.733] [0.735] [0.726] [0.835] [0.821] [0.822] [0.802]
CMS wage index 0.333*** 0.328*** 0.374*** 0.378*** 0.379*** 0.374*** 0.386***
[0.112] [0.113] [0.113] [0.120] [0.117] [0.120] [0.117]
Constant 106.647*** 109.199*** 109.067*** 106.728*** 106.828*** 105.780*** 106.688***
[9.753] [10.003] [9.675] [10.047] [10.161] [10.045] [10.069]
Observations 4549 4549 4549 4549 4549 4399 4399
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.04
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
all models include state and industry fixed effects
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 4 Model 6
Offers Choice 0.312*** 0.092 -1.105 -0.301
[0.117] [0.093] [2.128] [2.848]
% Wage < $10,000 -0.024***
[0.006]
% Wage $10-14,000 -0.097***
[0.004]
% Wage $14-20,000 -0.045***
[0.004]
51-100 employees -3.392*** -3.298*** -3.280*** -3.341***
[0.212] [0.199] [0.289] [0.344]
101-250 employees -2.774*** -2.597*** -2.529*** -2.652***
[0.204] [0.172] [0.426] [0.513]
250+ employees -1.600*** -1.788*** -1.122 -1.397
[0.151] [0.087] [0.719] [0.945]
Part of a larger firm -1.972*** -2.039*** -1.795*** -1.894***
[0.192] [0.180] [0.377] [0.461]
For Profit 0.032 -0.066 -0.022 0.021
[0.237] [0.212] [0.279] [0.312]
Health Expenditure Variation 2.198 1.81 2.459 2.446
[2.515] [2.539] [2.644] [2.693]
% Male <25 years -20.699*** -19.392*** -20.729*** -20.695***
[1.164] [1.140] [1.159] [1.180]
% Male >55 47.815*** 47.673*** 48.070*** 47.814***
[1.130] [0.981] [1.297] [1.330]
% Female <25 years -2.189*** 0.056 -2.176*** -2.295***
[0.806] [0.701] [0.807] [0.832]
% Female 25-54 12.322*** 13.260*** 12.423*** 12.364***
[1.002] [0.982] [1.106] [1.195]
% Female >55 39.643*** 42.974*** 39.711*** 39.796***
[2.445] [2.277] [2.419] [2.487]
County Population 10,000s 0.006* 0.003 0.006* 0.005
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]
County Per Capita Income 1,000s 0.030* -0.005 0.033* 0.031
[0.017] [0.014] [0.018] [0.020]
County per capita Medicaid discharges 0.008 0.008 0.002 0.005
[0.016] [0.015] [0.018] [0.020]
Teaching Hospitals -0.078 -0.055 -0.053 -0.061
[0.059] [0.050] [0.073] [0.079]
CMS wage index 0.025* 0.019 0.027** 0.027**
[0.013] [0.012] [0.013] [0.013]
Constant 138.924*** 142.708*** 138.927*** 138.859***
[2.033] [2.143] [2.036] [2.092]
Observations 4549 4549 4549 4399
R-squared 0.85 0.88 0.85 0.85
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
all models include state and industry fixed effects
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Offers Choice 0.056*** 0.048*** 0.045 0.079
[0.008] [0.008] [0.095] [0.094]
% Wage < $10,000 -0.003***
[0.000]
% Wage $10-14,000 -0.002***
[0.000]
% Wage $14-20,000 -0.001***
[0.000]
51-100 employees -0.012 -0.008 -0.011 -0.012
[0.010] [0.009] [0.012] [0.013]
101-250 employees 0.01 0.013 0.012 0.007
[0.010] [0.010] [0.019] [0.019]
250+ employees 0.039*** 0.026** 0.043 0.032
[0.012] [0.012] [0.034] [0.034]
Part of a larger firm 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.043***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.014] [0.014]
For Profit 0.011 0.002 0.01 0.013
[0.013] [0.012] [0.013] [0.014]
Health Expenditure Variation 0.118** 0.099* 0.121** 0.123**
[0.055] [0.051] [0.058] [0.058]
% Male <25 years -0.254*** -0.186*** -0.254*** -0.247***
[0.035] [0.033] [0.035] [0.035]
% Male >55 0.04 0.067 0.042 0.019
[0.074] [0.067] [0.075] [0.075]
% Female <25 years -0.390*** -0.266*** -0.390*** -0.393***
[0.035] [0.034] [0.035] [0.035]
% Female 25-54 -0.059** -0.033 -0.058** -0.059**
[0.026] [0.025] [0.027] [0.027]
% Female >55 -0.288*** -0.216*** -0.287*** -0.288***
[0.077] [0.076] [0.077] [0.079]
County Population 10,000s 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
County Per Capita Income 1,000s 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.005***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
County per capita Medicaid discharges -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Teaching Hospitals 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008*
[0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
CMS wage index -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Constant 0.567*** 0.666*** 0.567*** 0.560***
[0.047] [0.046] [0.047] [0.047]
Observations 4549 4549 4549 4399
R-squared 0.29 0.35 0.29 0.29
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
all models include state and industry fixed effects
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Offers Choice 0.027*** 0.023*** -0.201* -0.189*
[0.008] [0.008] [0.103] [0.102]
% Wage < $10,000 -0.001***
[0.000]
% Wage $10-14,000 -0.001***
[0.000]
% Wage $14-20,000 -0.001***
[0.000]
51-100 employees -0.002 -0.001 0.016 0.015
[0.009] [0.009] [0.013] [0.013]
101-250 employees 0.018* 0.020** 0.057*** 0.055***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.021] [0.020]
250+ employees 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.123*** 0.121***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.037] [0.037]
Part of a larger firm 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.079*** 0.083***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.015] [0.015]
For Profit 0.023* 0.021* 0.015 0.012
[0.012] [0.012] [0.014] [0.014]
Health Expenditure Variation 0.054 0.046 0.095* 0.094*
[0.048] [0.048] [0.055] [0.055]
% Male <25 years -0.102*** -0.078** -0.107*** -0.107***
[0.032] [0.032] [0.033] [0.033]
% Male >55 0.088 0.091 0.129* 0.117*
[0.061] [0.058] [0.068] [0.067]
% Female <25 years -0.128*** -0.087*** -0.126*** -0.141***
[0.032] [0.032] [0.035] [0.034]
% Female 25-54 -0.094*** -0.081*** -0.078*** -0.072***
[0.023] [0.023] [0.027] [0.027]
% Female >55 -0.199*** -0.156** -0.188** -0.165**
[0.069] [0.068] [0.074] [0.076]
County Population 10,000s 0 0 0 0
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
County Per Capita Income 1,000s -0.002** -0.003*** -0.002 -0.002*
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
County per capita Medicaid discharges 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Teaching Hospitals -0.006* -0.005* -0.002 -0.001
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
CMS wage index 0 0 0 0
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Constant 0.465*** 0.519*** 0.466*** 0.453***
[0.043] [0.043] [0.046] [0.046]
Observations 4549 4549 4549 4399
R-squared 0.1 0.12
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
all models include state and industry fixed effects
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in 1996 Full Sample
HMO Available 
in 1996
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Offers Choice 0.082*** 0.257 0.212 0.045*** -0.058 -0.023
[0.016] [0.188] [0.186] [0.012] [0.133] [0.132]
51-100 employees -0.043** -0.057** -0.050** -0.02 -0.011 -0.015
[0.018] [0.024] [0.024] [0.013] [0.017] [0.017]
101-250 employees -0.081*** -0.111*** -0.104*** -0.030** -0.012 -0.02
[0.020] [0.038] [0.038] [0.014] [0.027] [0.027]
250+ employees -0.100*** -0.159** -0.144** 0 0.035 0.021
[0.025] [0.069] [0.068] [0.019] [0.049] [0.049]
Part of a larger firm -0.052*** -0.074*** -0.072** -0.01 0.003 -0.005
[0.015] [0.028] [0.028] [0.011] [0.019] [0.020]
For Profit -0.111*** -0.104*** -0.106*** -0.070*** -0.074*** -0.074***
[0.025] [0.026] [0.027] [0.020] [0.020] [0.021]
Health Expenditure Variation 0.084 0.052 0.074 -0.028 -0.009 -0.011
[0.087] [0.096] [0.096] [0.069] [0.074] [0.075]
% Male <25 years -0.008 -0.004 0.003 -0.053 -0.056 -0.055
[0.057] [0.057] [0.058] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043]
% Male >55 0.125 0.093 0.116 0.022 0.04 0.033
[0.126] [0.134] [0.133] [0.103] [0.105] [0.106]
% Female <25 years -0.127** -0.129** -0.136** -0.055 -0.054 -0.064
[0.059] [0.060] [0.060] [0.044] [0.044] [0.045]
% Female 25-54 -0.003 -0.016 -0.011 -0.074** -0.067* -0.069*
[0.046] [0.048] [0.049] [0.035] [0.037] [0.038]
% Female >55 -0.278** -0.286** -0.311** 0.039 0.044 0.042
[0.131] [0.134] [0.135] [0.099] [0.101] [0.102]
County Population 10,000s 0 0 0 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
County Per Capita Income 1,000s 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
County per capita Medicaid discharges 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Teaching Hospitals -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.010** -0.008 -0.009*
[0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
CMS wage index 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Constant 0.487*** 0.486*** 0.490*** 0.121* 0.121* 0.132**
[0.087] [0.088] [0.089] [0.066] [0.066] [0.067]
Observations 4549 4549 4399 4549 4549 4399
R-squared 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
all models include state and industry fixed effects
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Appendix Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics for Variables used in Premium Standardization Model
N=19,031
Variable Mean Std. Dev
Plan Premium for Single Coverage 148.94 67.23
HMO plan 0.20 0.40
PPO plan 0.31 0.46
POS plan 0.05 0.22





Coinsurance Rate 16.06 10.20
Employee Stop Loss 0.77 0.42
Plan Self-Insured 0.24 0.43
Prenatal Coverage 0.93 0.26
Maternity Coverage 0.93 0.25
Prescription Drug Coverage 0.89 0.32
Mental Health Coverage 0.93 0.26
Alcohol Coverage 0.90 0.30
Dental Coverage 0.28 0.45
% Male <25 years 0.10 0.14
% Male 25-54 0.39 0.26
% Male >=55 0.06 0.10
% Female <25 years 0.09 0.14
% Female 25-54 0.33 0.25
% Female >=55 0.04 0.09
% Wage < $10,000 10.82 21.39
% Wage $10-14,000 20.33 24.15
% Wage $14-20,000 24.13 22.82
% Wage >$20,000 44.75 33.70
1-10 employees 0.36 0.48
11-25 employees 0.26 0.44
26-50 employees 0.13 0.34
51-100 employees 0.09 0.29
101-250 employees 0.09 0.28
250+ employees 0.07 0.26
Part of a larger firm 0.49 0.50
Agriculture/Forestry & Fisheries 0.02 0.14
Construction 0.05 0.21
Mining and Manufacturing 0.14 0.34
Transportation/Communications/Othe 0.05 0.21
Wholesale Trade 0.09 0.29
Retail Trade 0.20 0.40
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate 0.20 0.40
Professional Services 0.21 0.41




New Mexico 0.10 0.30
New York 0.13 0.34
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Appendix Table 2:  Model of Plan Premiums - Single Coverage
Variable Coeff Std Error
HMO plan -24.862*** [2.217]
PPO plan -8.552*** [1.465]
POS plan -13.776*** [2.956]






Coinsurance Rate -0.185*** [0.047]
Employee Stop Loss 3.377** [1.409]
Plan Self-Insured 0.67 [1.278]
Prenatal Coverage 6.976** [2.892]
Maternity Coverage 0.136 [3.072]
Prescription Drug Coverage 6.249*** [1.592]
Mental Health Coverage 2.73 [2.119]
Alcohol Coverage 3.277* [1.810]
Dental Coverage 9.166*** [1.083]
% Male <25 years -18.515*** [3.985]
% Male >=55 47.901*** [4.963]
% Female <25 years -0.319 [3.824]
% Female 25-54 13.399*** [2.450]
% Female >=55 44.731*** [5.742]
% Wage < $10,000 -0.022 [0.026]
% Wage $10-14,000 -0.096*** [0.021]
% Wage $14-20,000 -0.051** [0.022]
1-10 employees 9.957*** [2.131]
11-25 employees 6.542*** [2.119]
26-50 employees 1.917 [2.263]
51-100 employees -1.402 [2.373]
101-250 employees -0.75 [2.389]




Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
all models include state and industry fixed effects